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ABSTRACT
The rapid advancements in electronic 
technology over the past few years 
indicate both the need for vastly improved 
communications capability and the means to 
provide that capability. Use of the EHF 
frequency bands allocated for satellite 
communications and the development of 
signal processing capability for 
communications satellites will allow the 
next generation of military communications 
satellites to overcome the capacity and 
interference resistance limitations of 
todays systems. These improvements will 
also allow the use of small, highly mobile 
earth terminals, a capability that is 
highly significant to the combat forces.
INTRODUCTION
Today we have the most sophisticated and 
capable military command and control 
communications systems the world has ever 
seen. Military commanders can receive 
information from, and send direction to, 
widely dispersed forces through a variety 
of media under almost any condition. As 
capable and sophisticated as todays 
systems are, they are rapidly becoming 
obsolete, the explosion of the capability 
to gather and process information has put 
a huge strain on the communications 
systems needed to transfer that 
information. The frequency bands in use 
today are becoming increasingly crowded 
and the capability of an enemy to 
effectively jam these bands is growing. 
There is little that can be done to 
mitigate these problems for terrestrial 
communication systems, especially those 
systems that provide beyond line of sight
service. Fortunately, there are frequency 
bands allocated to military satellite 
communications (MILSATCOM) that can 
overcome the frequency crowding and 
difficulties with interference and, at the 
same time provide a new level of mobility 
and flexibility to the communications 
equipment for the combat forces.U) These 
frequency bands are in the vicinity of 20, 
30 and 44 GHZ and are commonly referred to 
as the EHF MILSATCOM bands. The 20 GHZ 
band, actually in the upper range of the 
SHF frequencies, is allocated for downlink 
service and the 30 and 44 GHZ bands are 
allocated for uplink service. In this 
paper we will investigate the enhanced 
operational effectiveness of combat forces 
through the use of modern satellite 
communications, review the evolution of 
the architecture for MILSATCOM systems, 
and discuss the motivation for a move to 
the EHF bands. We will then discuss the 
technology needed for such a move and the 
status of that technology development. 
Finally, we will discuss the tasks which 
lie ahead of us in defining the detailed 
requirements for tactical satellite 
communications, securing agreement to 
those requirements among the services, and 
obtaining the resources necessary to 




The function of a communications Is 
to provide a means for the flow of 
information and direction to and a 
decision maker* In the military, the'unit 
commander is the decision maker* The 
communications system handles 
status information and 
echelons and outgoing orders and 
reports to higher echelons. The of 
orders is "downward"; the flow of 
status reports is "upward 11 ;; and the 
of Incoming status Is all 
directions. Is if
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it is in the hands of the decision maker. 
Information that is extraneous to the 
decision being taken will only delay the 
decision and can be viewed as noise in the 
system. Information in a useable form 
must be in the proper hands in sufficient 
time for a decision to be taken and orders 
distributed to exploit the information. 
This exploitation of "real time 11 
information can be viewed as a three step 
process:
(1) locate targets with sufficient
accuracy to fall within the engagement
envelope of friendly forces.
(2) provide target information to a 
decision maker in a usable form.
(3) provide orders to friendly 
forces before targets have left their 
engagement envelopes.
This process requires effective 
communications between a sensor and a data 
processing facility; between the data 
processing facility and the decision maker 
(commander): and between the commander and 
his forces.\2) if we view the whole 
process as a feedback control system we 
can see that there is an absolute 
dependence upon effective 
communications to make the system Work. 
The required characteristics for effective 
command and control systems include 
several that are inherent to a modern 
satellite communications system; these 
are: availability, mobility, timeliness, 
jam resistance, flexibility and 
survivabilityJ 3 / The MILSATCOM systems 
of today have orbital parameters that 
ensure communications availability 
anywhere in the world. The frequencies
by MILSATCOM systems tend to minimize 
the effects of ionospheric disturbances 
allowing communications day or night any 
time of the year. Projected future 
MILSATCOM systems will even further reduce 
the propagation losses. As these systems
into the higher frequency bands.
smaller earth terminals become possible, 
increasing mobility. The proposed 
tactical satellite communications system 
will include the ability to interconnect 
earth terminals operating in different 
frequency bands - a feature that will 
significantly enhance operational 
flexibility. The combination of world­ 
wide coverage and highly mobile earth 
terminals allows the timely establishment 
of communications with any trouble spot. 
The increased bandwidth available at the 
higher frequencies allows the 
incorporation of techniques to negate the 
effectiveness of enemy jamming attempts. 
Finally, the location of communications 
satellites more than 35,000 kilometers out 
in space provides a level of physical 
survivability not found in terrestrial 
communications systems. These features, 
in combination, lead to communications 
capabilities that can provide extremely 
effective command and control of our 
military forces.
There are many approaches to the 
measurement of the effectiveness of 
improved command and control capabilities. 
Effectiveness can be measured in terms of 
weapons saved, lives saved, objectives 
obtained and so on. These measurements 
must be qualitative rather than 
quantitative. We can only estimate the 
resources required to attain an objective 
with, and without a particular command and 
control system. For example, we can 
estimate the number of weapons saved if we 
can redirect second strike sorties once 
confirmation of successful first strike is 
attained. We can improve the accuracy of 
the estimate through the use of computer 
simulation of the scenario with, and 
without, communications for redirection. 
But we can never experience the 
alternative not adopted. We can look at 
history and point out the successful 
operations that had effective command and 
control and the failures that did not. 
(When we are advocating effective command 
and control we obviously do not point out
the successful operations that did not 
have it or the failures that did).
The American soldier has enjoyed the 
reputation of an independent thinker 
capable of innovative approaches to 
unforeseen problems. This reputation is 
partially the result of the "citizen 
soldier" concept wherein the bulk of the 
fighting force is drawn from the ranks of 
a democratic society that highly values 
self reliance. Another important factor 
in this reputation is the historical 
ability to operate with minimum 
information because of a clear logistics 
superiority. When Japanese General 
Yamashita was asked to rate the Americans 
as jungle fighters he is reported to have 
replied "They are not jungle fighters- 
first they shoot away the jungle, and then 
they fight". Americans have long enjoyed 
the ability to use massive fire power to 
achieve military objectives. From carpet 
bombing by B-17s in Europe to air strikes 
on sniper positions in Viet-Nam, the 
philosophy was to heavily strike an area 
occupied by the enemy, even when specific 
targets could not be identified. Today 
that philosophy cannot be followed. The 
logistics superiority we once enjoyed 
simply no longer exists.(*)
In recent years we have moved to replace 
our superiority in fire power with a 
superiority in command and control 
systems. Reconnaissance by fire is being 
replaced with a variety of new and 
sophisticated sensor systems that can 
locate and identify targets in almost any 
environment. One drawback to this new 
situation is lack of acceptance by field 
commanders. No one likes to be dependent 
on resources beyond his control; yet 
maneuver elements cannnot be encumbered 
with large and delicate data processing 
centers. The problem becomes one of 
education. First, the distinction between 
data and information must be drawn.(5) 
Then the field commanders must be led to 
understand that systems that reduce data
and provide information are not making 
decisions for them; but rather are merely 
providing the basis for rational decision 
making.
Once battlefield acceptance of remote data 
processing is obtained, a new realm of 
operational effectiveness can be entered. 
Mobile units will no longer depend upon 
fixed or cumbersome command and control 
assets. Prepositioned communications for 
command and control will be unnecessary. 
With satellite communications, effective 
command and control of forward elements of 
units, such as the Rapid Deployment Force, 
can be accomplished by a CONUS battle 
staff until forward command elements can 
be established. The danger lies in 
allowing a drift from adequate control to 
overcontrol. The degree of control that 
is correct varies with the situation. The 
Mayaguez rescue benefitted from real time 
control from the Pentagon. The Israeli 
staff only monitored the communications 
among elements of the Entebbe rescue.(6)
A delicate balance must be maintained 
between providing: too and 
providing too little control. TOG* "help 11 from hinher hp^dnn^rfprc 15 viewed 
from the f'.ciu a,> rrr'.cr-. • -:-. ^g^v-it or 
worse. The day to dc/ •::•--.visions be 
made by the field commanders. The 
of the command and control is to 
provide adequate information which .to 
base a decision. Then the 
a field cor~a~d::r must be 
After the tal i of Tobruk it was the 
obvious choice for to* 
destroy the fleeing British - from 
Rommel's point of view. This decision 
should have be?-~ jverruled fas Kesselring 
attempted) until me German position in 
the Eastern Mediterranean was secured by 
taking Malta.
The examples are endless* For every Jack 
D. Ripper running out of control there is 
a. Charles Forbin trying to centralize all 
decision making.'?) The comrnu.nl cat ions
445
system provides the ability to give 
information and direction. Its proper use 
or abuse is a problem the design engineer 
cannot solve.
Satellite communications can enhance 
military operations in several other 
areas. Once the battlefield commanders 
have accepted the concept of a data 
reduction center that is not under their 
direct control, then such a center can be 
located at great distances from the sensor 
systems and command elements it supports. 
The remote location will greatly enhance 
the survivability of the data reduction 
center by removing it from the enemy's 
engagement envelope and release combat 
elements that would otherwise be dedicated 
to its defense. Communications with long 
range aircraft and naval units at sea 
require long range, reliable jam resistant 
communications that can be provided only 
by satellites. Modern satellite 
communciations systems also provide an 
effective means of maintaining contact 
with special military operations. The 
combination of small antenna size and 
narrow beam pattern achievable at the EHF 
frequency band allows communications with 
units, such as Airlift Combat Control 
Teams operating in enemy territory, 
without detection by enemy forces.
THE EVOLUTION OF MILSATCOM ARCHITECTURE
For the last several years the military 
services have been pursuing a MILSATCOM 
architecture consisting of three segments 
based upon the unique requirements of 
three user communities. The first segment 
provides communications for the nuclear 
capable forces who need the highest degree 
of physical survivability, ability to 
operate in an intense jamming environment, 
and world wide coverage with high 
availability. Most of the communications 
needs of the nuclear capable community can 
be satisfied with low data rate (75 baud) 
service. The second segment serves the 
wideband trunking community. This
community includes the Defense 
Communications System,the Diplomatic 
Telecommunications Service and other users 
characterized by high data rates and large 
fixed earth terminals. We use the term 
Earth Terminal to identify the terrestrial 
end of a satellite to earth communications 
link. The third segment of the MILSATCOM 
architecture provides 
service to the Tactical/Mobile user 
community. This community requires world 
wide coverage, the ability to operate in 
an intense jamming environment, often very 
close to the source of jamming, and low to 
medium data rates, typically voice grade 
service from small mobile or transportable 
earth terminals.
Today, the nuclear capable forces are 
served by the Air Force Satellite 
Communications System (AFSATCOM). The 
AFSATCOM space segment consists of 
dedicated Air Force UHF channels on the 
Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) 
satellite and transponders on other host 
spacecraft. Earth terminals are installed 
on SAC bombers, missile launch control 
centers, airborne and ground command posts 
and Navy radio relay aircraft.
The wide band trunking community is 
presently served by Phase II of the 
Defense Satellite Communications System 
(DSCS - II) which provides SHF Satcom 
service to a world wide network of fixed 
earth terminals under the management of 
the Defense Communication Agency (DCA).
The FLTSATCOM system currently serves the 
tactical/mobile community. The FLTSATCOM 
satellite provides fleet broadcast and 
fleet relay service as well as the 
AFSATCOM service previously mentioned. 
The fleet broadcast channel uses an SHF 
uplink; the remaining channels are UHF. 
Earth terminals are located on ships and 
aircraft of the fleet, mobile platforms 
such as trucks and jeeps and even back 
pack radios.
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The three segment MILSATCOM architecture 
included a near term follow-on system for 
each segment of the architecture. 
AFSATCOM was to be followed by the 
Strategic Satellite System; DSCS II by 
DSCS III; and FLTSATCOM by a leased UHF 
system known as LEASAT. The far term 
included an improved Strategic Satellite 
System, an upgrade to DSCS III or a DSCS 
IV and a new tactical satellite 
communication system called TACSATCOM - 
II.
The three segment architecture began to 
run into trouble in the summer of 1979 
when Congress deleted funds for the 
development of the Strategic Satellite 
System space segment, a new satellite 
intended to operate in polar orbits at 
super synchronous altitudes. At the same 
time the services were continuing their 
planning for the development of TACSATCOM- 
II. The TACSATCOM II planning was 
fragmented and discordant as each service 
concentrated on its own needs. Little 
consideration was given to the development 
of operational concepts explaining the 
role of satellite communications in the 
command and control of combat forces and 
the needs of joint forces were given 
practically no consideration.
Over the next year much attention was 
given to the strengthening of the case for 
the Strategic Satellite System. The 
planning for TACSATCOM II also began to 
take shape as the differences between the 
services were resolved. However, Congress 
was still not convinced and the funds for 
the Strategic Satellite System space 
segment were again deleted. Now the 
services were faced with a new problem. 
The time phasing of the two developments 
with the TACSATCOM development following 
the strategic satellite development could 
no longer be followed if the operational 
need date were to be met. It was clear 
that another look at the MILSATCOM 
architecture was warranted.
Last October representatives from the 
military services and the Defense 
Communications Agency, under the direction 
of Doctor Van Trees, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(communications, command, control and 
intelligence), initiated an intensive 
revaluation of the MILSATCOM 
architecture. The prime goal of this 
effort was to develop an architure that 
would be responsive to the needs of the 
military and acceptable to Congress. This 
goal can be met by developing the concept 
of truly a joint mission satellite. A 
satellite communications architecture 
based on satellites with mixed user groups 
can effectively indicate a unified DOD 
that strives for the cooperative 
exploitation of space.
After an extensive review of the 
requirements of each user community, it 
became apparent that there is a great deal 
of similarity in the needs of the nuclear 
capable forces and the tactical/mobile 
forces. Both user groups require world 
wide communications among small, highly 
mobile earth terminals. Both user groups 
need to operate in an intense jamming 
environment. Both user groups operate at 
voice rate and slower data rates. The 
basic elements of functional commonality 
of these communities has led to the 
consideration of a two segment 
architecture for the long term follow-on 
to the existing and programmed MILSATCOM 
systems. The two segment architecture 
will provide service to the wide band 
trunking user'community just as was 
planned in the three segment architecture. 
The nuclear capable and the 
tactical/mobile communities will be served 
by a new tactical communication satellite 
(we use tactical here in the broader sense 
of the word—supporting the maneuver 
elements). The remainder of this paper 
will focus on the tactical segment. 
Details of the new two segment MILSATCOM1 
architecture have yet to be fully 
developed. We expect that the concept of
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a joint mission satellite will lead to a 
generic communications satellite. A 
family of common, shuttle compatible 
spacecraft with joint communications 
payload electronics is feasible. 
Regardless of the orbital scheme to be 
pursued, a common payload design is 
practical. The only differences between 
spacecraft would be those dictated by the 
pecularities of the orbit selected.
We also expect the membership in the 
tactical user community will expand beyond 
the combined membership of the nuclear 
capable and tactical/mobile communities of 
the old three segment architecture. The 
tactical MILSATCOM system should serve, in 
addition to the current AFSATCOM and 
FLTSATCOM users, some elements of the 
Defense Communications System, the Rapid 
Deployment Force, the Ground Mobile 
Forces, and any other users who need a 
robust communications capability among 
small mobile platforms.
THE CASE FOR EHF
While many of the features of the next 
generation MILSATCOM system remain 
uncertain, one is becoming increasingly 
clear. The MILSATCOM system for tactical 
communications in the 1990.'s will include 
susbstantial capacity in the EHF bands. 
There are several advantages of EHF over 
the UHF and SHF bands now in use. Perhaps 
the most important of these is the wide 
bandwidths available in the allocated EHF 
bands. These bandwidths are available for 
increased capacity as well as spectrum 
spreading techniques for interference 
resistance. Unlike the UHF and SHF bands 
which are crowded with terrestrial users 
the EHF bands are not presently occupied. 
Systems operating in the EHF bands also 
offer the advantage of small high gain 
antennas and correspondingly small earth 
terminals—a factor that is particularly 
important to tomorrow's highly mobile 
tactical forces. Because there are no 
existing entrenched systems to satisfy, we
can pursue new, more efficient modulation 
techniques, applicable to all users and a 
standard building block set of earth 
terminal modules.(8)
The precise antenna patterns achievable at 
EHF, even with relatively small antennas, 
is another advantage of these frequencies. 
The narrow beamwidths that can be obtained 
help make an EHF system more covert. This 
covertness will allow communications to 
take place with units operating behind 
enemy lines and in other situations where 
they previously had to maintain radio 
silence to avoid detection. The precise 
patterns available also allow a reasonable 
sized spacecraft antenna to steer antenna 
nulls in the directon of interference 
sources further reducing the effectiveness 
of jamming attempts. To effectively 
accomplish this at UHF or SHF in a 
tactical scenario would require 
impractically large antenna arrays in 
space. The advantages of EHF do not come without 
cost. The EHF frequencies are affected by 
propagation losses, particularly at the 
higher frequencies, due to rain. These 
losses can be overcome by power, but more 
power is expensive—especially on 
spacecraft. The spacecraft power question 
is a prime reason for selecting a lower 
frequency (20GHZ ) for the downlink. 
Electron devices tend to be less efficient 
at EHF frequencies further aggravating the 
power/cost problem and adding a heat 
dissipation problem where none previously 
existed. These problems present some 
engineering challenges but they can be 
solved. The advantages of EHF in a combat 
environment far outweigh the 
disadvantages.
Other features are needed of a future 
tactical communications satellite if full 
advantage of the EHF frequency is to be 
taken. One of these is on-board 
processing to the base band level. This 
means that the satellite will despread, 
demodulate and decode the uplink signal;
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direct the signal to the appropriate 
downlink channel; and then reencode, 
remodulate and respread the signal into a 
format compatible with the equipment at 
the message address. This places the 
downlink power in signal transmission 
rather than wasting downlink power by 
retransmitting system interference.
Another feature of the next generation 
tactical communications satellite system 
is the use of satellite-to-satellite 
crosslinks to.avoid the need for multiple 
hop relays. This feature will allow any 
earth terminal to contact any other earth 
terminal without passing through an 
intervening earth terminal.
The EHF related features described here 
will be combined with more conventional 
UHF features and perhaps some SHF 
capability. The combined spacecraft will 
be designed for shuttle/IUS launch in the 
latter part of this decade. A constella- 
of approximately four to six 
spacecraft will provide the necessary 
worldwide coverage.
TECHNOLOGY FOR FUTURE MILSATCOM SYSTEMS
The preceding description of a new 
generation MILSATCOM system with a 
substantial increase in capability may 
seem like a lot of wishful thinking. Even 
with the advancements that we have seen in 
electronic technology, these capabilities 
are a radical departure from the 
capabilities of today's systems. We might 
be concerned that the state of technology 
may not be ready to support such an 
advanced system. In fact, all of the 
major technologies needed to implement 
such a system have been demonstrated or 
are now under development.
The Lincoln Experimental Satellites 8 and 
9 demonstrated the feasibility of several 
new technologies including the use of EHF 
for satellite communications and satellite 
to satellite crosslinks. A LASER
communications system suitable for high 
data rate crosslinks has been developed 
and tested. In air to ground tests, 
operating in an environment much more 
severe than would be expected of a 
crosslink, the LASER communication system 
demonstrated a Giga bit per second 
bits per second) data rate with a bit 
error rate of less than one per million. 
Satellite communications systems installed 
in large aircraft have been operational 
for several years and, in 1978, the 
feasibility of satellite communications 
with fighter aircraft was demonstrated 
using a B-52 AFSATCOM terminal installed 
in an RF-4C. Thus, all of the concepts for 
the new generation MILSATCOM system have 
been demonstrated. The specific items of 
hardware needed to implement those 
concepts are now under development.
Probably the most critical hardware item 
under development is the EHF transmitter 
which will operate in the 20 GH2 band on 
board the satellite. A large percentage 
of communications satellite failures in 
the recent past have been attributed to 
transmitter failures. This is 
particularly true in the higher frequency 
bands where only Traveling Wave Tube 
Amplifiers (TWTAs) were capable of 
providing the required output power. The 
military experience with TWTAs has been 
less than satisfactory. To date we have 
been unable to obtain TWTAs with long-term 
reliability commensurate with the 
reliability of other spacecraft 
components. This has made the desired ten 
year lifetime difficult to achieve. Solid 
State technology is now reaching a level 
of maturity where it can compete with 
TWTAs at the lower power levels. Solid 
State transmitters show promise of 
significantly higher long-term reliability 
than TWTAs. Solid State transmitters are 
not without there own set of faults, 
however. The low efficiency of the 
current Solid State transmitter designs 
requires much more spacecraft prime power 
than equivalent TWTA designs and also
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presents some difficult thermal 
dissipation problems, particularly at the 
higher frequencies.(9)
Because the TWTA and Solid State 
technologies each have advantages to 
consider, we are proceeding with 
development of EHF power amplifiers in 
both areas. We are currently developing 
an advanced TWTA for operation in the 
20GH Z band. This development is a joint 
effort with NASA Lewis Research Center 
which will produce a proof of concept dual 
mode tube capable of linear operation at 
either oftwo output power levels lOdb apart, 
This tube would normally operate at 2.5 
watts but could be commanded to operate at 
25 watts when higher power is required. 
We are also developing two types of solid 
state power amplifiers in the 20GHZ band. 
The first type uses IMPATT diodes as a low 
risk approach to achieve 20-25 watts of 
saturated power output. The second type 
uses GaAs Field Effect Transistors (FET) 
to achieve a linear output. This type is 
currently capable of about half the power 
of the IMPATT type and is viewed as a 
higher risk venture. At present we are in 
device development and expect to begin 
GaAs FET transmitter development in 1982.
The engineering of Solid State transmitters 
differs from the engineering of TWTA 
transmitters because the combined output 
of several Solid State amplifiers is 
needed to equal the ouput of one TWTA. 
The conventional approach to Solid State 
transmitter design has been to combine 
the output of several amplifiers in a 
resonant cavity, or other similar circuit, 
and then feed an antenna in the same 
manner as a TWTA would. As we move into 
the EHF frequencies the physical size of 
these circuits becomes increasingly small. 
Because the efficiency of the devices is 
also decreasing as the frequency 
increases, the thermal gradient and heat 
dissapation problem becomes severe. If we 
are to achieve an output power comparable 
with that obtainable from a TWTA at EHF,
another approach is indicated.
One approach is to place an amplifier 
behind each element of a phased array 
antenna. The output power is thereby 
combined in the far field of the antenna. 
This approach reduces the thermal gradient 
problem by dispersing the heat sources. 
It also raises overall efficiency of the 
transmitter by lowering the combining 
losses. Finally, this approach leads to a 
graceful degradation upon failure, since 
the loss of an element only slightly 
reduces the effective output power.
Another critical item of hardware under 
development is the laser crosslink system 
(LASERCOM). The LASERCOM system, which is 
capable of handling a Giga Bit per second 
data rate, is ideally suited for the 
satellite to satellite crosslink 
application and under favorable 
conditions, can be used for satellite to 
aircraft or even satellite to ground 
applications. Aircraft to aircraft 
communications by LASERCOM could also be 
handled using a relay satellite.
We have recently completed a series of 
field test of the LASERCOM system at White 
Sands, New Mexico. A high data rate 
LASERCOM transceiver was installed in a 
KC135 aircraft and a similar unit was 
installed in a ground facility at Cowan 
site on the White Sands Missile Range. 
These tests fully demonstrated the 
capabilities of the LASERCOM system in a 
dynamic environment. Acquisition and 
tracking were demonstrated under 
conditions far more severe than those 
found in space. In addition, some 
atmospheric and propagation effects were 
studied. The tests were highly successful 
indicating that the technology for space 
laser communications is mature and ready 
for operational deployment.
WHERE DO WE 60 FROM HERE
We have shown that all the critical pieces
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of technology needed for the next 
generation tactical satellite 
communications system have been 
demonstrated. What remains to be done is 
the integrate of that technology into a 
system and convince the Congress that the 
system merits development and deployment. 
To do so we must demonstrate that the DOD 
finally has its act together in the 
MILSATCOM arena. This is a task that 
cannot be accomplished by the 
technologists alone.
Whole new concepts for the conduct of 
tactical warfare need development. We, 
once again, have a situation where 
technology is racing ahead of operational 
concepts. We must avoid Maginot Line 
thinking. The operational concepts for 
the use of satellite communications 
systems at the turn of the millenium must 
be consistent with the operational 
concepts for the employment of new weapons systems in that time period. Finally,we must present an integrated system, 
responsive to the needs of all the 
services.
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